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ABSTRACT
An examination of 12 darkweb sites involved in selling hacking services - often re-
ferred to as Hacking-as-a-Service (HaaS) sites is performed. Data is gathered and
analyzed for 7 months via weekly site crawling and parsing. In this empirical study,
after examining over 200 forum threads, common categories of services available on
HaaS sites are identified as well as their associated topics of conversation. Some of
the most common hacking service categories in the HaaS market include Social Me-
dia, Database, and Phone hacking. These types of services are the most commonly
advertised; found on over 50% of all HaaS sites, while services related to Malware
and Ransomware are advertised on less than 30% of these sites. Additionally, an
analysis is performed on prices of these services along with their volume of demand
and comparisons made between the prices listed in posts seeking services with those
sites selling services. It is observed that individuals looking to hire hackers for these
services are offering to pay premium prices, on average, 73% more than what the indi-
vidual hackers are requesting on their own sites. Overall, this study provides insights
into illicit markets for contact based hacking especially with regards to services such
as social media hacking, email breaches, and website defacement.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Previous work has explored darkweb markets specializing in the sale of various
products relevant to malicious hacking (Nunes et al., 2016) including malware (Holt,
2013; Li and Chen, 2014), exploits, and botnet rentals (Ablon et al., 2014). As an
example, a comprehensive analysis of the darkweb service The Silk Road performed
by Christen et al. explores the large online marketplace and provides valuable in-
sights into the types of goods being sold, their revenues, and behavior of the vendors
(Christin, 2013). This research looks to complement these works by studying the
hacking services market; the market for contracted blackhat work that includes, but
is not limited to, social media hacking, email breaches, and website defacement.
To gain a better understanding of the HaaS market, 12 HaaS sites found on the
darkweb are extracted and its content subsequently analyzed. The goal of this analysis
is to find details that can provide the cyber security community valuable insight into
the structures and dynamics inherent in this market. For example, this research
explores the tools and methods used by the market actors to advertise, communicate,
and do business. As a result, 2 primary mediums of communication are observed
to facilitate HaaS service e-commerce: darkweb forums and individual sites. This
analysis also looks to identify the categories of hacking services available in the HaaS
market and measure their respective demand. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, Phone,
Social Media, and Email hacking service categories emerge as the most in-demand
services in the HaaS market. Additionally, an analysis of current market prices of
available HaaS services is also performed. Analysis results show individuals looking to
hire hackers for database or website related hacks typically offer to pay over $1000.00
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per job while only offering $400 for Social Media related hacks. An understanding of
additional relationships between suppliers and consumers is also sought.
In the efforts to address the goals stated above, this research makes the following
contributions:
• This study identifies the common categories of hacking services available in
the HaaS market. Social Media, Database, and Phone related hacking services
emerge as the most commonly advertised and are found on over 50% of all
HaaS sites, while hacking services related to Malware and Ransomware are
advertised on less than 30% of all HaaS sites. With analysis of the hacking
service requests found in reviewed darkweb forums, Phone, Social Media, and
Email account hacking are the most in-demand services, and therefore skill sets,
of those looking to hire hackers.
• A comparison of prices found in threads of HaaS forums (each a post seeking to
hire a hacker’s services) to those found advertised on individual HaaS sites (sites
selling hacking services) is performed. Consumers, individuals seeking to hire
hackers in HaaS forums, are observed offering to pay premium prices for hack-
ing services. Specifically, across 100% of the HaaS sites analyzed, consumers
were offering to pay, on average, 73% more than what individual hackers are re-
questing on their own sites. Additionally, for the specific Databases and Phone
hacking services, consumers are offering to pay, on average, 2 times as much.
Box plots illustrating the median differences between advertised and requested
prices of the Social Media and Website categories can be seen in Figure 1.1.
• This study also compares the prices of hacking services with their respective
volume of demand. Interestingly, as illustrated in Figure 5.8, a negative re-
lationship is observed between those services experiencing higher demand and
2
the prices listed by hacker vendors. Phone, Social Media, and Email hacking
services typically received 33% or more demand than other hacking services in
the market, therefore, it was expected to see a higher price for those services
listed by capable hackers; instead, the opposite was observed.
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Figure 1.1: Median Service Request Prices vs. Median Advertised Prices
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents an
overview of the HaaS market and additional background information relevant to the
study. Chapter 3 details the data sought and sampled for this work. Chapter 4
summarizes the darkweb mining system utilized to collect the data in this research.
Chapter 5 discusses the analysis performed and presents the subsequent findings.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the research and discusses potential future works.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
Darkweb. The Darkweb refers to web pages and other web content found on the
Darknet, a network not unlike the Internet we use everyday, but whose traffic uti-
lizes various anonymization protocols (including Tor, i2p, etc.). These protocols are
designed specifically with the intention to anonymize its users through the use of
encryption and network path management (Shakarian et al., 2016). This provides
its users a number of increasingly important benefits as each publicized cyber attack
further emphasizes the importance of a secure online presence. Many of the individ-
uals behind cyber operations (originating outside of government or military entities)
rely on these protections. After all, these anonymous networks can facilitate freedom
of speech (Biryukov et al., 2014) and insulate users from otherwise digitally oppres-
sive adversaries. Additionally, darkweb sites and forums are only accessible with
specifically purposed or configured web browsers. The Tor browser, for example, is
a browser specifically purposed to access sites and services found on the darkweb
(Biryukov et al., 2014). Some of the benefits of this anonymization include secure
and anonymous website hosting, browsing, and various other forms of online com-
munication. But along with its many benefits, there are also a number of negative
consequences to individuals having easy access to these kinds of networks.
With access to this kind of anonymization, a numerous and diverse set of online
markets have emerged offering a wide variety of, often illicit, goods and services.
For example, cyber attacks continue to become a more persistent threat and there
is research to show this may in part be due to the fact that cyber attack tools and
skillsets (i.e. exploits, botnets, stolen data, hacker services, etc.) are increasingly
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becoming available for purchase in the underground economy found on the darkweb
(Benjamin et al., 2015; Ablon et al., 2014). And although recent efforts have been
made to try to understand these hidden markets (Holt and Smirnova, 2014; Franklin
et al., 2007; Herley and Floreˆncio, 2010; Christin, 2013), little effort has been made
to understand a potentially very dangerous threat, the Hacking as a Service (HaaS)
market.
Much of the existing literature on darkweb markets have performed studies of
the prevalence, products, social activity, and identification of cybercriminals selling
stolen merchandise (Christin, 2013; Holt and Smirnova, 2014; Franklin et al., 2007;
Herley and Floreˆncio, 2010; Abbasi et al., 2014; Chu et al., 2012), the identification
of discussion topics in darkweb forums (Nunes et al., 2016), and the structure and
organization of the cyber theft market (Holt and Smirnova, 2014). Information for
this type of research is typically mined, often using automated or semi-automated
information retrieval systems (Holt, 2013; Chen, 2011; Zhao et al., 2016). Research
has also been performed to better understand the important factors affecting the
prices of some of these markets (Holt and Smirnova, 2014). But only recently has
more attention been paid to the human element behind cybercrime (Benjamin and
Chen, 2014). An analysis of six underground forums, performed by Motoyama et
al., explores the properties of the social networks formed as well as the relationships,
specifically related to trust, between the users within these sites (Motoyama et al.,
2011). Specifically, this study provides quantitative insight into the forum user’s
dynamic social activity and also analyzes the user’s interactions with one another.
Their research also explored the goods and services being exchanged between the
forum’s users.
Still, little research has studied the markets enabling the individuals who discuss
their intentions to perform attacks and fund those with the skills to do so. The
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cybercriminals who post advertisements online offering to sell their hacking skills as
a service to anybody willing to pay their price are also active players in this market.
An in depth understanding of this HaaS market has the potential to benefit others
involved in the cyber security space. For example, being able to monitor and detect
hack requests of specific public and governmental institutions or persons could further
assist those looking to develop early warning systems of cyber threats (Macdonald
et al., 2015).
Markets. Darkweb users list, describe, and sell their products in darkweb market-
places. Products found in these marketplaces often include goods and services relating
to hacking, drugs, pornography, weapons, and software services. Products found on
the darkweb often also include stolen goods and personal data including credit card
numbers, digital currencies, and user credentials. (Zhao et al., 2016; Herley and
Floreˆncio, 2010; Holt and Lampke, 2010; Motoyama et al., 2011).
Forums. Forums are user-oriented online platforms whose purpose is to facilitate
communication between its users and expand the knowlege base of its participants
(Motoyama et al., 2011). Users in forums participate in discussions on various top-
ics in the form of threads and are created by users asking a question or making a
statement (Holt and Smirnova, 2014). Forums often enable international communi-
ties of like-minded individuals to carry out discussions online. Forums hosted on the
darkweb are specifically designed with communication safety in mind (Nunes et al.,
2016). The forums studied in this research were comprised of threads related to the
purchase of a hackers time and services.
HaaS Market. This paper refers to the HaaS market as the online market made up
of existing and potential customers who need and have the ability to pay for the
services of hackers and their acquired skills. The customers, referred to as consumers
in the remainder of this paper, are those looking to hire hackers to participate in
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various forms of cybercrime, primarily in the form of hacking. This paper refers to
suppliers as those individuals or parties selling, or looking to sell, their hacking skills
for monetary reward.
Darkweb Sites. On the darkweb, the supplier and consumer actors were most often
observed to use two separate mediums for communication. Specifically, consumers of
HaaS services were mostly found to use topically focused forums to get the attention
of hackers. These users would provide both summarized details of the hack and
a monetary amount they were willing to pay the hacker to perform the described
hack. If a hacker browsing these forums is interested in contacting the author of a
particular post, the authors contact information provided in their forum user profile
would have to be used to establish further and private communication. This resulted
in the inability to collect any further transactional, user experience, or other desired
historical data.
Suppliers of HaaS services (hackers) were commonly found to use their own self-
owned and operated websites, rather than forums, to promote and advertise who
they were and their respective skillsets. These sites, typically observed to contain
one or two HTML pages, often detailed how much they were looking to be paid for
their respective services, and provided a way for potential customers to contact them;
typically in the form of an email address. Similar to that of forums, any transactional
details were unavailable as all discussion between supplier and consumer were carried
out in private.
7
Chapter 3
DATA CHARACTERISTICS
3.1 Sampling Methodology
To address the representative nature of the sites selected for this research and
within the HaaS ecosystem, the justification and sampling methodology used to iden-
tify these sites is presented here. Because the HaaS market and its sites are hidden
from search engines, commonly utilized sampling techniques for on-line data, such
as triangulation, where sampled sites and forums are identified using multiple search
engines and carefully chosen search terms, could not be used. Instead, human ana-
lysts utilized the snowball sampling procedure, a technique that uses often a smaller
collection of initial samples to gather additional future samples (Goodman, 1961),
often through acquaintances, mentions, links, etc. Specifically, the sites used in this
study were identified through links and mentions found while exploring other hacking
related sites and forums. Snowball sampling is a standard approach commonly used
by researchers in this space to collect data from a sample of prospective sites when
it is difficult to determine the presence of given elements in a population (Chu et al.,
2012; Holt, 2010, 2013; Li and Chen, 2014).
3.2 Targeted Sites
Human analysts, with the help of a number of non-English translators, were able
to identify just over 50 HaaS related sites after exploring the content of a number of
other sites and forums. During exploration, sites were classified as HaaS-related sites,
and recorded for further review, if the page content met any the following criteria:
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• Discussed the availability or sale of hacking services; not to be confused with
discussions related to hacking tools and products, namely packaged software.
• Discussed the desire to contact a hacker to perform a task or purchase a hacker’s
skilled services.
3.3 Targeted Data
In this study, to better understand the HaaS market, a number of key pieces of
information were collected from each site. The price of a markets goods and services
has been shown to be one of the most pertinent factors in cybercrime markets when
trying to understand supply and demand relationships (Franklin et al., 2007; Holt and
Lampke, 2010). Therefore, HaaS sites with available price data were sought-after and
preferred over sites without. Thomas Holt et al. showed that the tools and methods
used for communication between suppliers and consumers, as well as their available
methods of payment, also had effects on the market economics (Holt and Smirnova,
2014). This also includes any approaches available to suppliers and consumers to
communicate, leave business and product reviews, and make any payments. As with
price, darkweb sites with this information available were preferred over those without.
Many of the sites initially identified had varying amounts of useful information
provided. As an example of this, one site solely provided a few short sentences
expressing an interest in helping potential customers with their hacking needs and
provided an email address for further contact; no other details were provided. Sites
that did not contain sufficient information, as specified above, were not considered
useful for this study. Additionally, many of the sites identified were in languages
other than English, and as this effort did not have regular access to a translator,
the sites targeted were limited to English sites. Finally, to be able to quantitatively
measure and compare the products and services in demand by consumers vs those in
9
supply by hackers, categories for each type of product and service were established
and recorded in each forum and site used. Resultantly, a total of 12 individual sites
were used, two of which were forums, with an aggregate thread count of 202 between
them.
10
Chapter 4
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
This section discusses the design considerations, architecture, and contributions
of the Darkweb Mining Framework designed and developed for this study. Section 4.1
reviews the framework of (Nunes et al., 2016) which was used as a baseline for this
effort. Section 4.2 discusses its shortcomings along with the additional requirements
considered when designing the Darkweb mining framework. Section 4.3 discusses the
contributions made to Nunes’ et al. framework to meet the discussed requirements
in an effort to make a better system.
4.1 Legacy Framework
Nunes et al., in (Nunes et al., 2016), presents the cyber threat intelligence darkweb
mining framework and details using it to collect marketplace and forum content on
clearweb and darkweb sites. The framework takes advantage of human analysts, web
crawlers, parsers, and a database to effectively identify, scrape, extract, and store the
targeted information found in the targeted sites. These sites are crawled and parsed
on a weekly schedule, this helps to identify changes to site layout as well as additional
forum threads. A system block diagram of this framework is illustrated in Figure 4.1
and pseudo code of the software system can be found in Algorithm 1.
11
Figure 4.1: Darkweb mining system block diagram
S ←Sites and Forums list from Human Analysts;
foreach Hostname in S do
Send HTTP Request to Hostname;
if Site is up then
Crawl site;
Save visited HTML page(s) to local disk;
foreach HTML file saved to local disk do
Parse HTML file for meaningful information;
end
Save all parsed data to remote Database;
end
end
Algorithm 1: Nunes et al. Darkweb Mining Algorithm
Figure 4.1 and Algorithm 1 together show human analysts (stage 1) first provide
the system, residing on Machine A, a list of sites to access and crawl (2). For each
site on the list, the software attempts to access the web page and is subsequently
crawled if accessible. Each HTML page that is crawled is saved to a file on the local
disk (3) and subsequently parsed (4) for its targeted information. To avoid saving
incomplete data, the parsed contents are saved to a remote database on Machine B
(5) only after all pages have been successfully parsed.
12
4.2 Design Considerations
There are many challenges facing software systems tasked with collecting and
monitoring darkweb and, more specifically to this study, HaaS sites. And although
the Darkweb Mining Framework detailed in Section 4.1 provides the basic capabilities
of scraping and parsing darkweb sites, it does not lend itself well to the challenges of
collecting and subsequently monitoring any increase in number of sites nor the rapid
changes characteristic of many darkweb sites. As common with software systems
expected to scale and support evolving requirements, many characteristics, often at-
tributed to good software design and development practices, were not initially built
in. Software characteristics such as maintainability, re-usability, efficiency, and a
software’s ability to generalize fall under this category. Therefore, a redesign (or
refactoring) of the framework, was performed for this research effort and is discussed
here.
Many darkweb sites have been observed to relocate (i.e. change network addresses)
or simply stop being hosted, making data collection and monitoring time sensitive. It
also takes time to develop the web scrapers to sufficiently extract the necessary data
from each new site, compounding time sensitivity. The ideal darkweb mining frame-
work would minimize the time necessary to develop each new scraper by minimizing
the lines of code needed to be developed by maximizing code reuse wherever possible.
In the Nunes framework, development of crawler/parser modules proved to be repe-
titious and redundant as the developer was required to copy and paste much of the
code, common to all modules, into their site-specific crawler or parser. Specifically,
common function calls to the crawlers and parsers, as well as any error handling,
although found in all modules, was needed to be copied and pasted into a newly
developed module. Additionally, in the Nunes framework, code understanding, and
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as a consequence maintainability proved difficult as there were many components of
the architecture unnecessarily visible to crawler/parser developers solely tasked with
writing a specific site’s crawler and parser. For example, to test the capability of a
new module, the developer needed to first edit the Main algorithm to include their
newly introduced component(s), significantly increasing the likelihood of user related
errors. As more site crawler and parsers were developed, not taking advantage of code
reuse whenever possible and requiring the developer to understand significantly more
code than necessary to accomplish their task resulted in much lengthier development
and software testing times.
Additionally, similar to the websites found on the internet (clearnet), the sites
found on the darkweb are observed to have a variety of structures (i.e. marketplaces,
custom web pages, forums, social media sites, etc.). Therefore, a sufficient dark-
web mining framework must be generalizable; it must guarantee the ability to collect
heterogeneous data from any type of site. To achieve this, despite the numerous struc-
tural differences of the various target sites, the framework must maintain a consistent
and robust high-level execution pattern. Unfortunately, the Nunes framework exclu-
sively supported forums and marketplaces. It proved difficult to adapt the software
to support the widely varying structures of the HaaS sites commonly supported by
HaaS vendors and used in this study. The varying number of HTML pages-per-site,
their respective and often unique structures, and the page sizes themselves must all
be supported by the darkweb mining framework.
In addition to minimizing software development time and maximizing code reuse,
the ideal framework would also strive to minimize execution time. This becomes
increasingly important as the number of sites to be monitored and the frequency of
which the monitoring occurs is desired to increase. The Nunes framework, given a
very large forum to crawl and parse, and its serialized execution pattern (detailed in
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Algorithm 1) can take up to an hour to execute. If several of similarly of sized sites
were to be crawled and parsed, its understandable to expect several hours per execu-
tion. Given the time sensitivity of the sites intended to be monitored, a multiple hour
execution time is unacceptable. By utilizing parallelism and the ability to execute
more than one web scraper/parser at a time, this can be avoided.
The challenges and requirements discussed above were all considered when design-
ing a darkweb mining framework capable of monitoring and capturing the rapidly
changing content of the darkweb and HaaS sites. Section 4.3 will detail the sys-
tematic and algorithmic changes made in this work and Section 4.4 will discuss the
performance results of the contributions made.
4.3 New Framework
This paper now presents a crawler/parser framework, built upon that described
in (Nunes et al., 2016), but implements a number of changes to better address the
challenges and requirements discussed in Section 4.2. A system block diagram of this
new darkweb mining framework can be seen in Figure 4.2. Like the Nunes framework
detailed in Section 4.1, this new framework continues to utilize human analysts, web
crawlers, parsers, and a database as the primary components, although the hardware,
along with the software design and execution, has been modified.
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Figure 4.2: New Darkweb mining system block diagram
S ←Sites and Forums list from Human Analysts;
foreach Hostname in S do
Asynchronously spawn new process;
StartCrawler(Hostname) ; // executed within new process
end
Function StartCrawler(Hostname)
Send HTTP Request to Hostname;
if Site is up then
Crawl site;
Save visited HTML page(s) to remote storage;
end
StartParser(Hostname, remote file(s) location);
end
Algorithm 2: New Darkweb Mining Algorithm (Crawler System)
Function StartParser(Hostname, remote file(s) location)
foreach HTML file saved to remote location do
Parse HTML file for meaningful information;
end
Save all parsed data to remote Database;
end
Algorithm 3: New Darkweb Mining Algorithm (Parser System)
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Figure 4.2 and Algorithms 2 and 3 show human analysts (stage 1) begin the
execution process by providing the web crawler subsystem (2) a list of targeted sites
and forums in which to crawl. For each site on the provided list, this subsystem
iteratively looks in its collection of developed site-specific crawler plug-ins and, if
found, spawns a new process and begins its execution. The web crawlers are developed
to perform focused crawling of the targeted sites with a specific navigation policy;
the rules determining which navigation links, if any, to follow as a crawler navigates
each site. As the crawler comes to each new page within a site, the HTML is saved to
a remote machine (3) while maintaining a record of the directory of the site’s HTML
files. Upon each crawler’s completion, the crawler subsystem asynchronously sends a
message to the independent parser subsystem.
The parser subsystem (4), similar to a web server, perpetually waits for messages
from the crawler subsystem. This message contains both the name of the site that was
crawled as well as the directory to find the HTML files to parse. The parser subsystem
uses the site name to search its collection of developed parsers and, if found, spawns
a new process and begins it execution on the pages found in the specified directory.
Using site-specific parsing ’rules,’ each parser extracts all useful information present
in the HTML files. Upon parser completion, all of the extracted content is saved to a
remote database (5) as a batch to prevent incomplete data storage. There, the data
is available for convenient access and analysis at a later time.
4.4 New Framework Contributions
The design detailed above is beneficial in many ways. First, the ability to exe-
cute a crawler or parser in a separate process naturally insulates it from the main
code execution thread. A consequence of this is facilitating the development of
crawler/parser modules, as developers no longer need to be concerned with the de-
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tails of the other software components. Instead, their concern is now limited to the
common crawler/parser APIs. This utilization of individual software components
can be thought of as a plug-in approach, and it takes advantage of common software
engineering best-practices (eg. Object Oriented Programming and SOLID design
principles). This approach to the development of crawlers and parsers also greatly
reduces both the amount of code developers have to write and resultantly the time it
takes to create and test these modules. Overall, with the new framework, an average
development time decrease of 50% was observed and is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Development Time Comparison
Second, this new design also enables end users to collect and analyze more sites,
in a smaller amount of time due to increased crawler/parser throughput. By taking
advantage of parallel and asynchronous processing, the complete execution runtime
of this darkweb mining framework is no longer a function of the number of sites.
Instead, execution runtime is now constant, limited to the time it takes to crawl and
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parse the largest, and often the most time consuming, site; in other words, execution
runtime has reduced from O(n) to O(1). Additionally, as a consequence of increased
throughput, reduced execution times enable the end user to gather site data more
frequently.
In review, there are many challenges facing designers of software systems capable
of monitoring and capturing the rapidly evolving content and its respective structure
found within darkweb and HaaS sites. For a software system to be successful in
adapting to these dynamics, it must utilize software design best-practices (ex. code
reuse, generalizable, etc.), take advantage of parallel processing, and facilitate the
development of new code to support new sites and content. The Darkweb Mining
Framework presented in this section accomplishes those goals.
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Chapter 5
OVERVIEW OF HAAS DATA
This section presents an analysis of the 2 forums and their combined 202 darkweb
threads, each containing a request for a Hacking service, along with 10 HaaS websites,
each advertising the owner’s hacking skills and services. These forums and websites
were monitored over an 8 month time period for any changes and or updates made.
Although no changes were observed during this study, newly published threads have
been identified since the its completion confirming these forums remain active.
5.1 Services Requested
To explore the demand and services being explicitly requested in the HaaS market,
2 darkweb forums and their combined 202 threads are discussed here. The first forum
that was used solely contained HaaS request threads; in these threads, users detail
their desire to hire hackers. Each thread required a user to provide a description of
the hack being requested, choose a hacking category from a provided list of categories,
and the price they intended to pay for the hack upon completion. In the second forum,
in addition to HaaS request threads, other hacking related topics were found as well.
Each HaaS forum partitioned each thread and hack request by the hack category
for convenient exploration. The forum threads utilized in this study had publish
dates ranging over a 8 month span, containing dates from March 1 to November 1,
2016. During the duration of this research period, no changes were observed to these
threads content. Overall, this information provides valuable details into the types and
numbers of hacking services sought by consumers as well as insight into the financial
resources of those requesting the job.
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To better understand the market demand for the various hacking products, the
cumulative number of threads found for each hacking category is presented. These
categories include Phone, Social Media, Email, Website, Database, Grade Change,
and Other. Hacking requests generally related to Phones, Social Media accounts,
Email accounts, Websites, and Databases were categorized as such. The ”Grade
Change” category generally contained requests seeking individuals to hack into a
specified educational institution with the intent to change grades. Hacking service
requests falling outside the previously specified categories, considered niche, or too
general to categorize, were binned as Other. Figure 5.1 illustrates the cumulative
number of services requested by category.
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Figure 5.1: Service Request Count per Category
As seen in Figure 5.1, Phone, Social Media, and Email related hacking services
emerged as those in highest demand, each receiving at least 33% more demand vol-
ume when compared to each of the other services. Categorical textual analysis of
all threads in the 3 most in-demand categories found that some of the most com-
mon hardware and software platforms used today, including iPhone, Gmail, Hotmail,
WhatsApp, and Facebook were among the most popular targets. Word clouds of the
text found in the threads of Phone, Social Media, and Email categories are illustrated
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in Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 respectively.
Figure 5.2: Phone Hack Requests Wordcloud
Figure 5.3: Social Media Hack Requests Wordcloud
Figure 5.4: Email Hack Requests Wordcloud
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5.2 Services for Sale
This study also utilizes 10 HaaS sites in which the site’s owners (hackers) market
themselves and their skills with the intention of attracting customers. These sites
were observed to typically provide a short description of the site owners, a contact
email address, and a list of services offered with their respective prices. These sites
provide valuable information into the types and number of hacking services being sold
by suppliers and their expected prices.
For each site, all service descriptions, their prices, and the owners preferred method
of payment were recorded. During data collection it was observed that similar services
were being offered across sites. Therefore, categories of the hacking services being of-
fered were established. Interestingly, the categories that emerged were similar to
those found in the HaaS threads and their hack requests. The emerged categories
include Social Media, Database, Private Investigation, Online Life Ruining, Grade
Change, Phone, DDoS, Ransomware, Security Audits, Malware, and Other. As one
would expect, the Database category included those services discussing the hackers
ability to hack into a specified system and extract usernames and passwords from a
database. The Online Life Ruining category was made up of services in which the site
owner stated they could ruin or destroy anothers life and online presence. Further
details into the tools or methods used for this service were never provided, but in-
stead the sites suggested it was up to the consumer to specify the actions to be taken.
Some sites gave examples including cyberbullying or active online monitoring. The
Grade Change category, like the requests found in the forums discussed in Section
5.1, categorized services in which the hacker advertised their ability to hack into a
targeted academic facility and change ones grade and therefore grade point average
(GPA). Services categorized as ”Malware” included those services in which the site’s
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Table 5.1: Services Offered per site
Site Number Number of Services Offered
1 6
2 3
3 6
4 8
5 3
6 7
7 2
8 5
9 6
10 4
description generally offered to infect targeted individual or organizational machines
with malware. The Other category was established due to many of these sites explic-
itly stating they also offer other services not listed and, if interested, to inquire upon
contacting the site owner through the designated email address.
This study was interested in understanding both the hacking services being offered
in this HaaS market as well as the capabilities of those offering the services. To
understand the capability of the hackers, the number of services advertised on each
site was recorded. Table 5.1 shows the breakdown of this metric; each site is labeled
1 - 10. The Number of Services Offered column in Table 5.1 shows HaaS sites offer on
average 5 services, with a sample standard deviation of 1.94, thus it is reasonable to
conclude these individuals are often well rounded and have a diverse set of technical
skills.
To understand the frequency or availability of hacking services in the HaaS mar-
ket, a histogram of the number of sites offering a particular category of service is
illustrated in Figure 5.5. This figure shows Other, Social Media, and Database cate-
gories emerging as the 3 most common types of hacking services offered, each present
on at least 50% of all HaaS sites. Malware, Ransomware, and Security Server Audit-
ing services were least frequently offered only being found on 2 sites. Interestingly,
many of the most frequently offered hacking services correspond to those services
24
being most frequently requested in HaaS forum threads discussed in Section 5.1.
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Figure 5.5: Hacking Services Availability
5.3 Pricing
A products price is considered one of the most pertinent factors in cybercrime mar-
kets when trying to understand the supply and demand relationships in that market
(Franklin et al., 2007; Holt and Lampke, 2010). Therefore, each price associated with
either a service offered (via HaaS site) or in demand (requested via HaaS Forum) was
recorded. This section discusses these findings.
The services being offered on these HaaS sites and their respective prices can
offer valuable insight. Intuitively, similar to posting for-sale ads in a newspaper
classifieds section, these prices can be considered the hackers perceived market value
of that service and what they have determined is a sufficient price for their time
and skills. Figure 5.6 illustrates the mean, median, and standard deviation of prices
calculated for each service category offered across all HaaS sites. Grade Change,
DDoS, Ransomware, and Online Life Ruining service categories emerged as those
whose hacking service providers considered the most valuable while Malware, Server
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Security Audits, and Social Media were considered the least valuable. The relatively
large standard deviations are a result of a few sites asking for significantly higher prices
compared to the others. It was observed that if a site was asking for a relatively
high price for any particular offered service, that site would also charge relatively
higher prices for all other advertised services. The Malware and Ransomware service
categories can be seen not have a standard deviation, this is because of the two sites
that mentioned these as offered services, only one had a listed price.
Figure 5.6: Offered HaaS Service Prices
In the HaaS forums, the prices accompanying each service request thread provides
insight into the prices consumers are willing to pay and their perceived cost for each
service. Figure 5.7 illustrates an aggregate of the services requested by HaaS forum
users and their respective posted prices. Similar to before, the prices of each service
category was calculated by taking the mean and median offered price across all forum
threads within that service category. The Grade Change, Website, and Database
hack requests emerged as the services that consumers are willing to pay the most
for, while Social Media hack requests, on average, are considered the least expensive.
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The standard deviation of each category’s prices was also calculated. Here, it was
observed the relatively large price standard deviations corresponded to the expected
degree of difficulty of each hack request. For example, if somebody requested that the
hacker break into and extract information from several email accounts, the price they
offered for this was higher than if they were to request only a single email account be
hacked.
Figure 5.7: Requested HaaS Service Prices
5.3.1 Supply and Demand Relationships
Here additional analysis is performed in an effort to better understand any rela-
tionships between the HaaS market buyers and sellers.
First, to better understand any relationships between hacking service prices and
their respective demand, from a consumer’s point of view, it would be valuable to
compare the average prices the consumer is willing to pay for a particular category
of attack, and the demand that category was seeing in the hacking request forums.
Therefore, Figure 5.8 illustrates the median prices of requested service next to their
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cumulative request count found in the forums. Interestingly, the hacking services
consumers were most interested in purchasing (experiencing the most demand) were
also generally the cheapest services. Figure 5.8 is a combination of Figure 5.1 and
the median prices found in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.8: Service Request Count vs. Median Listed Price
In an effort to further understand any consumer and supplier pricing patterns,
it would be valuable to look at a comparison between the average price at which
consumers were looking to purchase a hacking service against the average price at
which suppliers were looking to sell those same services. HaaS service prices found
on the hacker’s sites to those prices listed in the forums. This analysis can be seen
in Table 5.2. It can be seen that sellers and consumers of Grade Change hacking
services generally agree on price (prices are within 10% of each other), but notable
pricing differences (close to 100%) emerge between the Database, Other, and Phone
hacking service categories. For example, consumers looking to hire database hackers
(Database service category) are willing to spend close to $800 over, or 200% of,
what hackers with those skills typically ask for on their own HaaS sites. Similarly,
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Table 5.2: Average Demand Price vs. Average Advertised Price
Category Avg. Demand Avg. Advertised Demand - Advertised Demand/Advertised
Database $1,445.65 $655.32 $790.33 2.21
Other $825.00 $408.92 $416.08 2.02
Phone $763.33 $395.53 $367.80 1.93
Social Media $404.54 $275.99 $128.55 1.47
Grade Change $926.60 $911.14 $15.46 1.02
Average: 873.025 529.39 343.65 1.73
individuals looking to hire hackers for services categorized as Other, are willing to
spend close to 2 times more than the price those respective vendors seek. Across all
services, it can be seen that consumers are willing to spend, on average, approximately
1.73 times more than what vendors of those services ask for.
More detailed comparisons of each hacking service category’s advertised price and
budgeted price can be seen in Figures 1.1 and 5.9. Specifically, price collection details
such as the median, min, max, as well as the 1st and 3rd quartiles, are illustrated in
these box plots.
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Figure 5.9: Service Category Median Request Prices vs. Median Advertised Prices
Understanding why there exists such significant differences between the price ven-
dors are willing to spend, and what hackers are looking to be paid could provide
valuable insight into this HaaS market. For example, as seen in Table 5.2, consumers
of Database, Other, Phone, and Social Media hacking services are willing to pay
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premium prices to attract the attention of hackers with those specified skill sets. In-
terestingly, these economic characteristics are not unlike those seen in the market
conditions found in a ”sellers” market; a market in which the supply of goods, or in
this case skilled hackers, is relatively scarce and therefore results in consumers paying
higher prices. One possible meaning of this is that there is currently significant room
for additional hackers with these in-demand skill sets to find profitable employment
in the HaaS market. Alternatively, it could mean that there are other facets such as
trust, competition, offline transactions, and exposure to law enforcement that are not
accounted for by solely examining the information in these forums threads.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
This paper sought to bridge the gap in research literature and understanding of
the structure, prevalence, and supply and demand relationships of the HaaS market.
This study examined 10 HaaS websites and 2 darkweb forums (and its encompassing
threads) to provide an analysis of this darkweb market. Textual analysis of common
hack request categories providing insight into common topics of some of these requests
is performed. This paper analyzed the supply and demand characteristics of the
hacking services observed and explored the service’s prices set by those in the market.
These set prices were compared between various actors in the market.
Once again, as cyber attacks continue to become a more persistent threat, there is
research to show this increase is, in part, due to cyber attacks increasingly becoming
available for purchase in the underground economy found on the darkweb (Benjamin
et al., 2015; Ablon et al., 2014). An in depth understanding of this HaaS market and
the capability and intentions of its actors, has the potential to provide a number of
benefits.
6.1 Future Work
This study did not perform social network analysis on the HaaS forums used but
is often utilized as way to gauge site activity and social interaction among users; this
type of analysis could certainly be performed in this setting to better understand
these things as well site growth (Motoyama et al., 2011). Additionally, social network
theory and analysis could be applied to HaaS forum posts to build an understanding
of the most active users and determine whether customers come back to these sites
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and do additional business. As Herley et al. explains (Herley and Floreˆncio, 2010),
business transactions in illicit activity markets are rife with scammers; those vendors
who do not provide the good or service they are paid for. An active user base and
regularly returning customers could suggest these HaaS sites are a proven reputable
place of business and not just a place to take advantage of unsuspecting users.
As discussed in Section 5, the HaaS site’s content did not change during the
duration of this research and unlike the HaaS forums, the HaaS sites contained no
reliable publish date information. Therefore, it was impossible to gauge the frequency
of visitors to the site. To achieve a better understanding of these site’s network traffic,
port scanning could be utilized as described by Biryukov et al. (Biryukov et al., 2014)
Categorization of hack request posts were often performed manually due to mis-
categorization by the user. This problem could be considered and approached as a
multi-label classification problem similar to that performed with Marin et al (Marin
et al., 2016). Each category of post could be determined by the posts description using
common machine learning text analytic methods. If this process were automated, sys-
tems could be developed to actively monitor these HaaS forums to maintain relevance
and popularity of each category over time. An automated system could also actively
monitor the differences between these HaaS services supply and demand character-
istics and provide a valuable temporal analysis. This application could also further
assist those looking to develop early warning systems of cyber threats (Macdonald
et al., 2015).
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